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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 17620 
JAMES vHLLAF.D HEAl<N, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the denial of a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus by the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, Judge, in 
the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County. 
JAMES WILLAlill HEARN 
Appellant Pro Se 
Box 1000 
Marion, Illinois 62959 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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IIJ '.lHB SUPkEME COURT OF THE STA·rE OF UTAH 
S'!i>.T E OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
J .~i·lES vHLLARD HEARN 1 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17620 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus which challenged the validity of a 
Utah detainer pending against appellant. Appellant is 
presently confined in the federal prison in Marion, Illinois. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on February 15, 1980 in the First Judicial District 
Court of Utah, the Honorable Venoy Christofferson, presiding. 
T~ petition was denied on the grounds tnat the court had no 
jurisdiction because appellant, at the time, was not 
tmprisoned in Utah. This Court, in State v. Hearn, Utah, 
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621 P.2d 707 (1980), held that the lower court did have 
jurisdiction over the matter and remanded the petition for 
further proceedings. On February 23, 1981 a hearing was ~k 
in the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable VeNoy 
Christofferson, presiding (H.R. 41).1 Appellant was 
represented at the hearing by Clint S. Judkins. On February 
24, 1981 the petition was again denied (H.R. 42). It is fro"' 
this denial that appellant brings this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Order denying 
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 20, 1970, while serving a sentence in the 
Washington State Prison in Walla Walla, appellant was served 
with a warrant for his arrest pursuant to a robbery char~ 
pending against him in Utah. Pursuant to the terms of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereafter IAD), appellant 
was taken to Utah where he was tried and convicted in t~ 
First Judicial District Court of Utah on the robbery chM~ 
(T.R. 35). Thereafter, appellant was sentenced to a term in 
the Utah State Prison (T.R. 44). After appellant began his 
Utah sentence, Washington officials requested that he be 
lFor convenience, citations to the trial record are given 
herein as (T.R. ) and citations to the Habeas Corpus reccr 
are given as (H.P::-~_) throughout this brief. 
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returned to serve his sentence there. Utah complied with 
~ashington's request and placed a detainer on appellant for 
hlS return to Utah after the completion of his Washington 
sentence. 
In April of 1976, appellant was transferred from 
the Washington State Prison to the United States Penitentiary 
in Marion, Illinois. After his transfer, Utah placed a 
detainer on appellant in Illinois. In his petition, appellant 
challenges the validity of this detainer on the grounds that 
the above proceedings were improperly conducted. 
ARGUMENT 
POit'JT I 
UNDER THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON 
DETAINERS, APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE 
GRANTED HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR UTAH'S 
FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY RETURN HIM TO 
WASHINGTON FOLLOWING HIS CONVICTION. 
Appellant, who is presently serving time in the 
federal prison at Marion, Illinois, claims that his 
application for parole at that prison has been adversely 
affected by a Utah detainer pending against him. The detainer 
pending against appellant relates to a 1970 Utah conviction 
for robbery, for which Utah seeks jurisdiction over appellant 
to force appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence. It 
appears that appellant is claiming the detainer against him is 
invalid because Utah violated the terms of the Interstate 
~qreement on Detainees when appellant was transferred to Utah 
-3-
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in 1970 to try him on the robbery charge. Appellant points 
out that after his conviction in Utah he began serving his 
sent.ence at the Utah State Prison before he was returned to 
Wasnington. Appellant was sentenced on October 27, 1970 and 
was transferred to Washington on December 21, 1970 (T.R, 44
1 
47). 
Article II(e) of the IAD provides, "At the earlies~ 
practicable time consonant with the purpose of this agreement, 
the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state." 
Appellant appears to contend that he should be granted habeas 
corpus relief from his Utah conviction because Utah delayed ir. 
returning him to Washington. This position is not supported 
by the language of the IAD nor by caselaw. 
The IAD is found in Utah Code Ann., § 77-29-5 
(Supp. 1980). (The IAD was previously found in Utah Code 
Ann., § 77-65-4 (1953), as amended.) Article IX of the IAD 
begins, "This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to 
effectuate its purpose." The purpose of the IAD, as stated in 
Article I, is to provide for the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of detainers, based on untried indictments, 
informations, or complaints, because these outstanding charge: 
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. 
In Saunders v. State, 397 A.2d 548 (Del. 1979), the 
. 11 d iolation defendant sought habeas corpus relief for an a ege v 
-4-
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of the IAD. In Saunders, the defendant had been sent to 
~laware, convicted, and sentenced to 14 years in the state 
~nitentiary. This conviction was reversed, but in the 
interim oetween the conviction and reversal the defendant was 
convicted of murder. The defendant claimed that he should 
have been returned to the federal authorities after his 
convict ion and not tried on new charges, which were not the 
basis for the original detainer. The Court rejected this 
c~im and dismissed his petition because the defendant failed 
to particularize which section of the IAD had been violated 
and because he failed to demonstrate how Delaware's delay in 
returning him had violated the policies and purposes of the 
IAD. Therefore, unless a state's failure to comply with the 
provisions of the IAD violates the policies or purposes of the 
IAD, habeas corpus relief is not appropriate. 
Further support for this conclusion is found in the 
framework of the IAD. In accordance with its purpose, to 
provide for the expeditious disposition of untried charges 
against a prisoner, the IAD prov ides that the charges against 
a prisoner will be dismissed if the state where the charges 
a~ pending fails to bring the defendant to trial prior to 
returning him to the asylum state, or if the state fails to 
accept temporary custody of the prisoner. Article IV(e) and 
Article V(C). There are no penalties in the IAD for a 
-5-
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violation of Article V(e). Clearly, the efficacy of the IAD 
is not destroyed by the receiving state's failure to 
immediately return a prisoner to the asylum state follow~g 
his conviction. 
The case of Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F.Supp. 104j 
(D.C.N.Y. 1979) further supports the position that habeas 
corpus relief is not appropriate for a mere violation of the 
!AD. In Williams, the court denied a habeas corpus petition , 
in which it was claimed that the IAD had been violated, 
stating: 
Since the heart of the agreement is 
to protect a prisoner's rehabilitative 
opportunities, a violation should be 
considered in a federal collateral 
proceeding in terms of prejudice it 
causes a prisoner. 
Id. at 1054. 
The facts in the instant case establish that the 
purposes of the IAD were effectuated and that appellant was 
not prejudiced. While serving a sentence in the Washingtoo 
State Prison, appellant was transferred to Utah, pursuant to 
the terms of the !AD, where he was convicted of robbery, 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison and then returned to 
Washington. Thus, the proper status of the detainer against 
appellant was determined before he was returned to Washington. 
-6-
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Appellant makes a few general representations that 
he was prejudiced by having his term at the Utah State Prison 
commenced before he was returned to Washington. However, 
there is no showing that appellant's rehabilitative 
opportunities were affected by Utah's failure to immediately 
return him to Washington. Since if and when appellant is 
returned to Utah to finish serving his sentence he will be 
given credit for the time served between October 27, 1970 and 
December 21, 1970, there could be no harm. In summary, habeas 
corpus relief should not be granted appellant because the 
purposes and policies of the IAD were not violated nor was he 
prejudiced during the proceedings in Utah. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED 
IF HE IS RETURNED TO UTAH TO SERVE HIS 
SENTENCE. 
Appellant also contends that if he is required to 
return to Utah to serve his sentence, the principles of law, 
set forth in White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1980) 
and Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) would be 
violated. These cases are distinguishable from the instant 
case and the principles adopted therein are wholly 
inapplicable here. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In White v. Pearlman, a prisoner, who was released 
by mistake from prison due to no fault of his own, 
re-established himself in society and was then forced to 
return to prison to complete his sentence. The court in ~ 
held that the prisoner's sentence had run while he was at 
liberty. The court reasoned it would be impossible for a 
prisoner to ever re-establish himself if he were not allowed 
to serve his sentence continuously. 
In Shields v. Beto, the defendant had been 
extradited from Texas, where he was serving a sentence, to a 
Louisiana penitentiary. Twenty-eight years following the 
extradition, Texas tried to reacquire jurisdiction over him. 
The court held that Texas had waived jurisdiction over the 
defendant by extraditing him to Louisiana, especially where 
i 
Texas had failed to take any affirmative action to secure the 
1 
defendant's return. 
In the instant case, appellant was transferred to 
Utah pursuant to the terms of the IAD to be tried for robbery. 
Under the IAD, Utah, as the receiving state, was obligated to 
return appellant to Washington once the status of the charges 
against hilil were determined. To hold as petitioner suggests 
1 by re tur ning hirr ' that Utah waived jurisdiction over appel ant 
to v.·ashington would be contrary to the terms of the IAD. 
such were the case any state, after trying a prisoner from 
-8-
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another jurisdiction, would be faced with a dilemma. It could 
return the prisoner and lose the right to impose a sentence on 
nirn or it could inunediately impose a sentence and violate the 
terms of the IAD. Therefore, it is implicit in the IAD that 
when the sentence in the asylum state has been completed, the 
receiving state can reacquire jurisdiction over a prisoner to 
impose on him his sentence. 
Furthermore, in the instant case, unlike Shields, 
Utah took immediate steps to reacquire jurisdiction over 
appellant. A detainer was filed in Washington after appellant 
was returned, and a detainer was filed against appellant at 
the federal prison in Illinois when he was transferred there. 
The instant case is also distinguishable from White 
in that the prisoner in White would have been severely 
prejudiced if prison officials had been able to keep him in a 
state of limbo, never allowing him to complete his sentence. 
Here appellant has failed to show how Utah's delay in 
returning him to Washington prejudiced him. 
Habeas corpus relief is limited to extraordinary 
circumstances. This Court, in Brown v. Taylor, 21 Utah 2d 96, 
4,U P.2d 968 (1968), outlined the limited scope of a writ of 
naceas corpus. 
-9-
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Id. at 969. 
. It [habeas corpus] is not a 
substitute for and cannot properly be 
treated as a regular appellate review 
[citation omitted]. It is an 
extraordinary remedy which is properly 
invocable only when the court had no 
jurisdiction over the person or the 
offense, or where the requirements of law 
have been so disregarded that the party 
is substantially and effectively denied 
due process of law, or where some such 
fact is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the 
conviction [Citing Bryant v. Turner, 19 
Utah 2d 2841 431 P.2d 121 (1967)]. 
Appellant's claims in the instant case do not 
raise to the required level of seriousness to make the 
granting of appellant's petition appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1970 appellant was transferred from ;v~shington 
to Utah, under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, where " 
was tried and convicted of robbery. Appellant was returned to 
\~asnington and later transferred to the federal prison in 
Marion, Illinois. Pursuant to his Utah conviction, a detainer 
was placed on appellant in Illinois. Appellant does not 
challenge the validity of his conviction; he seeks habeas 
corpus relief on the grounds that Utah violated the IAD ~ 
failing to immediately return him to Washington after his 
conviction. However, Utah's delay in returning appellant to 
vlashington did not violate the purposes or policies of the 
-10-
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IAD nor did it prejudice appellant. Under these circumstances 
nabeas corpus relief is not appropriate, and the petition was 
r,,roperly denied. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A&;;;;?;r~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copi2s of the foregoing brief, postage prepaid, to James 
~1llard Hearn, Attorney Pro Se, Box 1000, Marion, Illinois, 
62959, this 8th day of December, 1981. 
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